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Induced innov~tion is an ~mportant and well dorm)cnte(lconc(’l)t
at the micro-economic level and has many important implication< for flevelop-
ment theory and policy (Hayami and Ruttan
Schuh 1974, Binswanger 1973, 1974). This
macroeconomic foundations and to get away
on which the macroeconomic
For empirical work in this
at the micro level is also
Moreover, the
version of the
1972, Ruttan 1973, de Janvry 1973,
is reason enough to develop its
from the graphic kinds of arguments
hypothesis now rests. (Abroad, 1966).
area a mathematical treatment of irrdllced jnnovst~on
necessary.
way in which induced innovation is handled in the
growth literature has led to more skepticism about the usefulness of inclurwl
Innovation in such a context. Nordhaus (1973) develops new critical argument”.
and summarizes the older misgivings about the growth model versions of induced
innovation. He points out that better micro economic foundations are needed
before progress can be made with induced innovation growth models.
This paper goes a step in this direction by reformulating
innovation possibilities on the basis of research processes, which have
expected pay-off functions in terms of efficiency improvements, and by
explicity introducing research costs. The benefits of research occur over
the lifetime of the project into which the research results are embodied.
This leads to the specifications or research as an investment problem in
which present value is maximized. The solution is an optimal mix of
research processes which determines simultaneously the bias and rate of
technical change. The model is presented entirely in comparative static
terms. .2
The following section is devoted to the reformulation of innovation
possibilities. This is the crucial problem of any induced innovation fr.~me-
work. In section three the reformulated innovation possibilities are bui]t
into a model. Its behavior is examined under different assumptions about
research budget constraints: no constraint is imposed on research funds at
first. ‘J’hen a constraint is imposed on research funds alone and finally tl]e
budget constraint covers both the research budget and the physical investment.
budget of the firm. The different budget constraints substantially change
the behavior of the model.
Section IV shows that Ahmad’s (1966) model and Kennedy’s (1964)
Innovation Possibility Frontier (IPF) are special cases of the model developed
here. Section IV also discusses the problem of dynamic extension of the model
and some limitations implied by its assumptions.
A few of the major implications of the model may be summarized
here: The reformulation of invention possibilities on the bas~s of research
processes which have a cost, leads one to reject the existence of a techno-
log~cal frontier which could be observed, at least in the most advanced
firms. No firm would ever carry research to a point at which research payoffs
become zero, a point which one may call the scientific frontier. How close
a firm will come to the scientific frontier depends on where marginal benefits
from research equal marginal costs of it. Indeed, rates and bjases of
technical change are determined by four factors:
j) The relative productivity of alternative research IJnes,
i.e., the size and biases of invention possibilities and
the exogenous changes occuring in them over time.
ii) The price or cost of research.3
iii) The total present value of factor costs and not only
relative factor prices or relative
iv) The constraints on the research or
of the decision making unit.
A quite surprising result is that,
factor shares.
investment budget
when no budget constraint on
research resources exist, one cannot necessarily predict that a rise in the
present value of the cost of, say, labor will result in stronger labor-saving
bias. It may indeed lead to a stronger labor-using bias than before the rise.
This shows that the inuitive idea on which Hicks (1964) based his induced
innovation idea and which was the basis of all future theorizing does hold
only under certain conditions, which are spelled out in this paper. Another
result is that a budget constraint which covers both research and physical
investment will tend to bias research into a capital saving direction even
if it were neutral without such a constraint.
Viewing Kennedy’s (1964) IPF model as a special case of th~
model developed here one can show the exact conditions which must hold for
such a frontier to exist and to be stable over time. These conditions are
so restrictive that it is safe to conclude that a stable IPF cannot arise
from research processes and that therefore the concept should be abandoned.
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INVENTION POSSIBILITIES
In their paper “A Model of Technological Research”, Evenson
and Kislev (1971) treat research as a sampling process, using seed research
as an example. They assume that there exists a probability distribution of
potential yield increase5 which is determined by nature, the state of ba%ic
sciences and plant breeding techniques. Research is viewed as drawing4
successive trials from this distribution. Given the number of trials m,
the expected pay-off from the research is the first order statistic or the
largest yield increase found in the sample. All other trials can then be
discarded since only the plant with the highest yield will be used for the
new variety. Given the distribution of potential yield ~ncreases one can
define ex ante the expected pay-off from research as the expecteclfirst .—
order statistic of a sample of size m, which is a function of the sample size.
F(AYlm) = h(m) (1)
where AY1m is the largest yield increase in a sample of size m. E(AY1m) iS
an increasing function of m but the marginal pay-offs decline as the sample








A research administrator who maximizes expected returns from resear{h will
3 equate marginal expected pay-off with the marginal cost of research .
There are two sources of uncertainty in this model: The
distribution of potential yield increases may be well defined, but most
likely the decision maker will not know it with certainty. He may have
formed expectations about it from his knowledge of previous research and
the state of the arts. It should therefore be viewed as a subjective
probability distribution of potentfal yield increases, whose parameters
have an expected mean and variance.5
The other source of uncertainty comes from the variance of the
expected first order statistic, which would exist even if the underlying
distribution was known with certainty.
In what follows it will he assumed that the decjsion maker
Is risk neutral, i.e. maximizes expected return from investment wfthf)ut
considering the variance of the expected return. This js a ronsider.lble
simplificationbecause the optimal decision is the same whether the
distribution of possible yield increases is known with certa~nty or not,




be done as if we were dealing with a certainty mode14.
adapt Evenson and Kislev’s (1971) view of technological
induced innovation problem, we have to specify the implica-
tions of research processes for factor proportions. If we write a factor
augmenting production function as
Y= f(f ‘ ;) (3)
where the notation is defined in Table 1, one can make the reduction in A and
B functions of a research line, say m. Mathematically it would be easiest to
assume that the reduction in A is a function of one research process while the
reduction of B is a function of another research process. A research decision
would then be a decision to augment one factor of production. In the real
world, however, decisions to increase efficiency are never decisions to
augment a factor but decis~ons to pursue different lin,esof research vl}ich
result in the embodiment of some new finding or qual~ty jn a physical factor
of production. And only by coincidence would the factor into which the new




















Table 1: Summary of notation
output
profit or present value (expected)
rate of technical change (expected)
bias of technical change (expected)




B augmentation coefficients or input-output ratios













stock and annual labor flow
price and wage rate
interest
cost, labor cost
value of capital and labor cost
amount of primarily capital-saving and primarily
labor-saving research
prices per unit of m and n
scale functions
their first and second order derivatives
productivity coefficients or research
to reduce A
to reduce B7
embodied technical change usually augments ,allfactors ~1]various dc~gt-ee:,.
An experiment station embodies new qualified in a seed variety ( a capital
item). The physical quantity of seeds needed to produce one unit of
output may or may not decrease, but the amount of land and labor needed
will most likely decrease at any set of factor proportions. If a research
result from a research process iS embodied in a new machine it may decrease
labor and capital requirements in various proportions and increases in
capital requirement are not excluded. Hence the case in which one research
line augments only one factor is not very attractive for model purposes.
(This special case may be called the orthogonal case). The model wi~l
therefore assume that each research line affects both the labor and capital
augmentation coefficients. In a model of induced innovatio~ where factor
proportions are endogenous,at least two such research processes are necessary,
each one with different relative impact on the augmentation coefficients.
In the most general case one would like to define the research pay-off
functions as follows:
A+ = A* (m, n,....., k)
(4)
B* =B*(m, n,oCOc.,k)
where m, n and k are research lines and A* = (A. - Al)/Ao and
B* z (B. - Bl)/Bo . The subscript zero refers to the coefficients before
research while the subscript 1 refers to the coefficient after research.
A technological advance corresponds to positive values of A* and/or B*
Equations (3) and (4) would lead to a very general model. A
variable proportion production function is combined with very general pay-
off functions in which research activities can interact in complex ways,








be quite intractable. The following simplifying assumptions are
introduced:
The production function is of fixed proportions, i.e.,
min (~ ,
,A :) (5)
and B are now simply input-output ratios.
Research results are additive, i.e. the results from one research
can be implemented independent of the research results from the
other process.
(c) Research is subject to decreasing returns.
(d) Only two research processes are considered and they are subject to
the same scale function.
(b), (c), and (d) combined lead to the following specification of invention
possibjlltiea6.
A* = p(m)am + ~(n)an
B* z p(ti~m + p(n)en
where p,v~o
lJmSPn~ 0
~~9 Unn < 0
and the a’s and 6’s are constraint in either of two ways:
i) In the
am > ~m —
~n > an —
ii) In the




am > 0 > fp ——
f3n>07an. ——









































Figure 1 : Innovation Po-~ibilit,l~s
Point P is (Ao, Be), the present input combination needed to produce one
unit of output.
The arrow from P to Q indicated how much one unit of n alters
this input combinationwhile the arrow to R indicated how much the necessary
input combination is altered by one unit of m. Under decreasing returns of
both n and m,the line from Q to R is the “isoquant” of possible technolog~e~
which can be developed by a linear combination of one unit of n and one ul]it
of m. If Q’ and R’ are the points where increases in n or m no longer yield
any further productivity changes (i.e. Um = 0, ~n = O),then the firm can
achieve any input combination in the rectangle PQ’SR’. However, research pay-
offs need not become zero anywhere in this model. Figure(la) is the pure10
technical change case of assumption (8a). Each line of reqearch red~lce~
both capital and labor requirements. Tn figure (lb), correfipondjng tn tll[>
substitution case (8b), each line of research saves one factor at the
expense of the other factor. The substitution case is more general since
it includes factor substitution at a cost as a special case.7
Invention possibilities are neutral (as in figure (la)) if
c1 m= !3n
m a = Bn .
(9)
Neutrality would, however, only be a coincidence and is not assumed in the
paper except in some special cases.
Additivity is quite restrictive. Results from one research cannot
affect productivity of the other research. For ex post or objective research
pay-off functions this would be too restrictive. Too many cases are docu-
mented in which research results from one research effort proved useful in
other projects. But here we are dealing with subjective functions. The
dramatic cases of pay-offs of one research line for other research lines were
most often unexpected. If they had been expected, more resources would
a priori have been devoted to
are random, the choice of how
lines will not be affected by
are independent. 8
The assumption of
the research lines. If ex ante the interactions
to allocate a research budget among research
interdependenceand expected pay-off functions
decreasing returns to research (7) is necessary
to define a well behaved problem. If the returns were constant, it would be
possible to reduce the input requirements to zero. Tf the price of research
also were constant, it would either not pay to pursue a research line at all11
or alternatively pay to pursue it until at least one input requirement would
be zero.g
Identical scale functions mean that returns to research decrease
at the same rate with the number of m trials and the number of n trials. If
they become zero (which is not necessary for the model) they become zero at
the same number of trials. Since the research productivities of m and n can
differ according to the productivity coefficientsa and Pthis is not a very
?estr.ictive assumption. It can also be relaxed easily, at the cost of a
more complicated notation.
The reformulation of invention possibilities on the basi< of
actual research processes which have a cost leads directly to the rejectjon
of any concept of an obsenrable technological frontier on which at least
the most advanced firms or
research never become zero












be built with a finite or infinite amount of research. But an economi.zjng
unit would not spend research resources up to the point where marginal
expected benefits from research are zero but only the point where marginal
benefits equal marginal cost (see equation (17) below).
The innovation possibilities described here are a comparative
static concept, valid for one period only. As basic sciences advance and
as information about the true underlying probability distribution of
production coefficients accumulates, the expected pay-offs will change,
i.e., the research productivity parameters will change from period to
period. This problem will be discussed further in Section IV.12
III
COMPARATIVE STATIC ANALYSIS
The production function (5) and the research possibilities described by (6)
to (8) can be built into models of various complexities. The simplest case
is developed first, a case in which the research costs and the research
benefits occur in the same period and in which the benefits do not extend
beyond one period. Extension to the case where the benefits accrue over a
fixed number of years, i.e., the lifetime of the plant into which the results
are embodied, is then achieved by a simple switch in notation, leaving the
algebra unaffected. Extension to true multi-period optimization or growth
models is not considered here, but the fundamental problems which such an
extension faces are discussed in Section IV. The expected bias Q and the
rate of technical change S for a fixed proportion production function are
defined as follows:10




Equation (10) can be rewritten in terms of
pay-off functions:
Q = u (m)(am - Bm) + P (n)(ctn - Bn)
and its change as
dQ=p (am- Bm) dm+ u (an - 13n)
m n
The expected rate of technical change is a
(1())
the parameters of the research
dn .
function of









the total value of
(11)13
Consider then a firm which wants to build a new plant. ‘1’h e
firm has the option of buying a plant of existing design with the input-
output ratios A. and B. and the fixed capacity Y. Alternatively the fi~m
can do research to reduce the input-out ratios of the plant to be built
according to the research functions (6) to (8). Since output iS given, the
only decision variables of the firm are m and n. Profits can be Wrftten as:
v = PY - RK -wLo+ o
+ RKoA*(m,n) + WLoB*(m,n) - mPm - nPK1~ (12)
The first three terms are value of output, capital co~t and labor costs of
the plant of existing design. They are constant and will be collected into
the constant term V. = PY - RKO - WLo , i.e., the profits without any researclt
Writing
CK = RKO = RYAO
CL = W-LO= WYBO .
We can rewrite (12) as follows:
v = V. + cKA*(m,n) + cLB*(m,n) - mPm - nPn (14)
Substituting (6) into (14) and rearranging terms in m and n leads to
V=v +p (m)(CKam + CL6m) +p (n)(cKan+ cL~n) o
– mPm - nPn (15)
as the final form of the maximizing problem.12
No Budget Constraint
The behavior of the models is first examined without a constra~nt on the
research budget. Investment into research will proceed up to the point where
marginal research benefits are equal to marginal research coats, and not to
the scientific frontier, unless research costs are zero. This iS shown hy
the first order conditions.
(13)14
Pm(cKam +cL@m) =# (=1)
lJnq#’ + CLIP) = pn (=1) ,
(17)
The units of m and n are chosen such that their prices are equal to one.
To trace the behavior of the optimal solution, differentiate totally.
Vmm(cKam + cIf3m) dm = d~ - pmamdcK - p @mdcL m
(18)
Pnn(cKan + cL6n) dn = dPn - pnandcK - unBndcI .
,
Multiplying the left hand side of the equatfcms by Um/Hm and IJn/\d
n
respectively and using the first order conditions; nnd multip]ylng ,]11t_erm~,
in dc
K
and dc~ by cK/cK and c /c respectively leads to equat~on~ in proportion<]]
1. L
or logarithmic changes of c and P.
dm (Pm/Vm) = dlnPm - cK~mamdlncK - cLpm@mdlncI (18a)
dn (Unn/pn) = dlnPn - cKpflandlncK - cLpn6ndlncI .
and solving for dm and dn




dlnpn - cKpnandlncK - cLpn@dlnc
dn = L. ———
?lnn/Pn
Fquations (19) lead to the first observation: It is neither factor prices
alone, as in the Ahmad (1966) version of induced innovation, nor factor
shares as in the Kennedy - Weizsticker-Samuelson (1966) version of induced
innovation which alone influence optimal research mix and hence rates and
biases, but it is research costs and total factor costs which are ~mportant.15
Considering factor prices alone neglects the importance of factor quantity
in factor costs while factor shares alone
13 of output on optimal research amounts.
research costs.
Given the signs of the
can show that research price has a
neglect the impact of the scale
Both approaches, of course, neglect
derivatives of the functions in (7) one
negative effect on each line of research.
The size of the negative effect depends on the curvature of the research
functions. Since the amount of m research is independent of the price of n
research (equation 20) it follows that total research and the rate of technical
change decline if the price of either one or of both lines of research rises.
If only the price of the more capital-saving research line m rises, technical
change will be more labor-saving. This can be shown by substituting (20) into
10(b), holdfng Pn constant, and recalling the sign conventions 8(a) or 8(b).










Call the effect of the cost of a factor on the line of research which tends
to save it more strongly the own-cost effect (e.g., am /alncK) and Cal] the16
effect effect on the other line of research a cross-cost effect (e.g.,











The magnitudes of the own
productivity an or $m and
carried (indicatedby the
product is the sum of the
o.
effects depend
on how far the
on the own costs, the own research
process of research has already been
ratio pm2/lJm). Since the logarithmic change of a
logarithmic changes of its components we can write
cllnCK = dln R + dln ~ or dln CK = dln R + dln Y + dln A. and similarly for
dlncL . By the chain rule, therefore, the following equations hold:
am am am - am
—’m= alncK alnKo ahfio ~ 0
(23)
an 3n an an — .— .—. =—
alnll 2
0.
alncL alnW alnLo o
(The effect of Y is discussed later). Hence equiportional rises fn any
component of factor cost (facto & rice, input quantity, initial input-output
coefficients) have an effect of equal sign and size on the research saving
the particular factor. A higher input-output coefficient corresponds to a
lower efficiency of the factors. Hence the less efficient a factor, the more
research resources will be devoted to it. This decomposition of the factor17









will be taken for granted in the remainder of the paper.14







T%e sign of these effects depends on whether we are in the pure technical
change (equation 8a) case or in the substitution case (equation 8b). [n the
pure technical change case an axdBm are positive, i.e., the capital-saving
research line also saves labor, and vice versa. Therefore the cross effects ——
w-illbe positive, and a rise in labor costs will tend to increase research
along ~he more capital-saving line of research.
Tn the substitution case, where an and E3mare negative a r~se ~n
labor costs will tend to decrease research along the capital-saving line
because that line uses labor; but the labor cost rise is a signal for more
labor saving.
Tn the substitution case it is possible to get unique answers for
the influence of factors costs on expected biases.
Rewriting (lOb) in terms of h/~lnc K
and 2n/31nc and u~ing the
K
chain rule leads to
.i&---
alncK Pm)::ncK = Mm(am - — + !.ln(an - f3n) .&-- ,
alncK
(25)18
(am - Sm) is always positive and (an - B*) is always negative by equation
(8a) or (8b). If an/alncK is negative, then a rise in capital costs results
in a rise in the capital-savingbias. The opposite result obtains for a
rise in labor costs. This is the intuitive idea on which all induced
innovation reasoning is based. But it can only be shown for the substitut~on
case, not for the pure technical change case. Then an/alncK is positive
and the sign of (23) is undetermined. An example in which a continued r~se
in labor costs eventually leads to a reduction in the labor-saving bias
will illustrate this point.
Let p(m) = m - l/2m2 s p(n) = n - l/2n2
and am . fin. 1 s an = Bm = 1/2
and cK=l P cL = 1, 2, 4, 6 respectively.
Table 2 shows the result for the optimal amounts of m and n and
Table 2: An example of the effect of labor costs OF
the bias
Factor Costs Optimal research Efficiency gains
levels
CK CL m n A* B*





1 1 1/3 1/3 .4166 .4166 0
1 2 1/2 3/5 .5850 .6075 -.0225
1 4 2/3 7/9 ,6821 .6975 -.0154
1 6 3/4 11/13 .7129 .7225 -.0096
———. .—. — —.—--——19
The first increase of labor cost over capital cost leads to a labor-saving
bias. But the size of this bias is reduced as labor costs continue to rise.
The reason for this behavior lies in the dimjnfshing returns to
research and the fact that both lines save some of both of the fa(tor~. A’,
labor costs first rjse, the more labor-saving line is expanded more rapidly
than the capital-saving line. Hence, when labor costs continue to rise,n
research is in a range with smaller marginal returns than m research. The
absolute labor-saving achievable through expanding m may now be larger th,ln
the one achievable by n research despite the fact that, at equal m and n,
n is always more labor saving than m. Suppose labor costs were to 1ise to
almost infinity, and capital costs were zero. Since both lines actu.lllyS,IVO
labor it would be optimal to push both lines to the point where m~rglna]
pay-offs are zero. But if invention possibilities are neutral, the opt~mal
point will be the points S in figure (la), which corresponds to a neutral
technical change.
To determine the effect of output on research levels, consider
equation (19) and hold all prices and input coefficients constant,dlncK and




pm(~@m + CL~m) = - ~ L o _=.—
alnY Pmm
(26)
an Un pnPn —= .—un(cKa
alnY Unn ‘+cL6n) =-— Unn 20.
Since by (17) the terms in the brackets times the first derivatives of the
scale functions are positive and equal to research prices, the signs of (26)
are easily established. An increase in the capacity of the plant ~ncreasc’s20
both research levels and thus leads to a higher rate of technical change in
both the substitution and the pure technical change cases. While the model
has no economies of scale with respect to research it has such economics
with respect to
The
the output of the plant.
effect of output on the bias is:
(This derivation sets equation
$9(CF- N) l (27)
Unn
(26) into (lOa) with the research prices equal
to one. ) This expression can be positive or negative in both the substitution
and the pure technical change case. Hence scale effects need not be neutral
even if research possibilities are neutral. This is again due to the
assumption of diminishing returns to research.
The conclusions are briefly summarized here in terms of labor and
the more labor-saving research line n. The conclusions for capital and m are
analogous.
i) A rise in the price of n will result in a reduction of n research
and turn the bias in a more labor-using direction.
ii) A rise in the price of n and/or m will result in a decrease of
total research and hence in a smaller rate of technical change.
iii) An increase in the scale of output will increase both m and n
research and the rate of technical
neutral.
iv) Anything which changes
change. The effect on the bias may not be
factor costs changes the optimal research
mix. A rise in the wage
increase the amount of m
two variables have equal
rate or the initial labor-output ratio tends to
research. Indeed, equiproportional rises in these
effect on research quantities. Rises in labor costs21
will lend to an increase in the more capjtal-saving research line m if w6*
are in the pure technical change case, but to a decrease in the substitution
case. A labor cost rise will always lead to a more labor-saving bias only
in the substitution case. In the pure technical change case the effect on
the bias is undetermined.
Benefits occuring over time
The model does not really change when we assume that the benefits
from research occur over the total lifetime of the plant rather than only
over one period. Since research results are embodied in the plant and hence
have to be found before the plant is built, we still have a single period
optimization, but it affects costs and benefits over the lifetime of the




Y? P(t)e dt - RK - L ‘m(t)e dt
o 0 Qo
+ RKoA*(m)n) + B*(m,n)LoTW(t)e ‘rtdt (28)
-mPm-nPn .
Remember that ~ is capital stock, not a flow while Lo is annual labor flow.
P(t) and W(t) are the expected prices of output and the expected wage rate as
a function of time. They may of course be constant. The firm has to pay for
the total capital stock now and R is the purchase price per unit of capital.
Maintenance costs of capital are neglected. The first three terms are again
constant and are denoted by Vo.
Letting22
CK = RKO
c = Lo&(t) e-rtdt
L
We can rewrite (28) as
= present value of capital cost
= present value of labor cost t
v= V + CKA*(m)n) + CLB*(mjn) - mpm - nPn .
0
(28a)
This equation has precisely the same form as (14) and can be transformed into
an equation equivalent to (15) with capital C’s replacing the lower-case C’S.
Hence all the conclusions of the previous section are identical if we replace
factor costs cK and CL by P?X2SetIt VdU63 of factor costs CK and CL. Not only
current costs but the whole stream of future costs associated with the plant
become important. 15
The change is more than just a switch of notation. It can be used
to illuminate the Fellner (1961) proposition on induced innovation. Salter
(1960) stated that induced innovation was not a viable theory because the
entrepreneur could not be induced simply by high wages to seek labor-saving
innovations. He would be interested in saving costs regardless of whether it
is labor costs or capital costs. The absolute level of the wage rate would
not matter in that decision but only the relationship of it to the value of
the marginal product. The previous section, as well as Ahmad’s (1966)
work have, of course} proven that this criticism is not valid. Fellner
(1961) tried to get around the Salter criticismby asserting that it is not
the level of the wage rate but the anticipation of a future wage rate rise
which prompts the entrepreneur to seek out labor-saving inventions. But for
the mechanisms of induced innovation it makes no difference whether the
entrepreneur anticipates a rise in the wage rate or whether he believes that23
W(t) is a constant. Present value of labor costs will influence the research
mix in both cases. Of course more research will be undertaken if W(t) is a
rising function of time than if it is constant at its initial value. But that
is a question of level, not of mechanism. Fellner’s proposition is therefore
misleading.
Reformulation in terms of
of the effect of the rate of interest
capital R) and of the lifetime of the
present value also allows a consideration
(separatelyfrom the purchase price of
project. Both occur only in labor
costs. A rise in r decreases discounted labor costs by giving less weight
to the cost of distant periods and a rise in the lifetime T raises labor
costs by adding more periods, i.e.,
~lnCL/ar : 0 ; alncL/aT ~ 0 ,




Labor-saving research is reduced as the rate of interest (or the opportunity
cost of capital) rises or as the lifetime of the project is reduced. In a
similar way it is easily prwed that an increase in r
lead to an increase in m research in the substitution
the pure technical change case (equation 24). In the
and a decrease in T
case and a decrease
substitution case a
in r and a reduction in T will lead to a more labor-using bias but in the
technical change case the sign cannot be established. (equation 25).16
Research budget constraints: “The Kennedy Case”





discussed in section IV, it is possible to derive a Kennedy Innovation Possibility
Frontier from equations (6) and a research budget constraint24
mpm+npn-F .() (30)
where F is the research budget. Maximizing present value (equation 28a)
subject to (30) leads to the following first-order conditions.
-mPm - nPn+F=O
v JCKam+ cLfP) =
uIl(cKan +cLBn).
Totally differentiating
(1 + a)Pm (=l+A)
(31)
(1 + A)Pn (=l+A) .
these equations, seeting pn’= pn = 1, and going through
the
the
same transformations to proportional changes used to go from (18) to (18a),

























Y ’22 = lJn/Mnn < 0




























dm . 22 0 2
811 + ’22
(33)
gllso + S1 - S2
dn =
’11 + ’22
The denominator is always negative because both gll and g22 are negative.
Assembling the terms in dlnCK from s and S2 we have:
1
(34)
(34) is always positive if
This is always the case when an is negative (substitutioncase), but also
holdsj when an is positive. The proof is as follows: setting pm and pn = 1








CK + CL(W!F$’ CK + CL(PW)26
Since under both conditions (8a) and (8b) flm/am<@n/an the inequality in
(35) is satisfied regardless of the signs of an and ~m. Simiarly, it can be
proved that the other own-cost effect is positive as well:
an >0+
ahcL – (36)
Since, when the budget constraint is binding and research prices are equal,
dm = -dn, it follows immediately that the cross-co[]t effects are equal to the
own-cost effects.
am _ an and arl _ am # -—
alnCK alnCK a]nCL alnCL
(37)
In contrast to the unconstraint case this allows us to prove monotonic relation-
ships between biases and factor costs.
Setting (37) in to (14): 1,
aB am
alnCK
= Um(am - flm)=- IJn(an- ~n)~n > 0 .
alnCK – (38)
K
A rise is discounted capital (labor) costs will lead to a more capital-savfng
(labor-saving)bias. The expression dlnCK and dlnCL can, of course, be broken
down into their components and each analyzed in turn. When the budget constraint
is binding an increase in one line or research is only possible at the expense of
the other line, This is why it is now possible, even in the pure technical
change case where it was not possible before, to predict that a rise in dis-
counted labor costs will result in a stronger labor-saving bias.
Furthermore, it can be shown that a rise in capital costs has an
effect of equal size but opposite sign on research effort than an equiproportion-
al rise In discounted labor costs when research prices are equal.27




From (34) and the equivalent equation for ~m/alnCL we can obtain the following
condition which must hold for (39) to be satisfied.
- cK(umam + Pnan)= + cL(um8m + l+.)n)
or rearranging terms
pn(cK@+ cL13n)= Pm(cKam + cLsm) .
Checking with the first order conditions (31), both sides are equal when
research prices are equal, Q.E,D.
Since furthermore, dm = -dn, the scale of output Y can have no
effect on the bias, because it affects CK in the same proportion as CL. Again
in contrast to the previous unconstraint case, scale effects are now neutral.
The signs of the effects of research prices are identical to the
unconstraint case. It cannot be proved that a change in the research budget
has a neutral effect. Biases can result when one research activity is already
so large that it encounters strongly df.minishingreturns. An increase in the
research budget is then primarily spent on the previously neglected line of
research.
The simple fact that a budget constraint exists allows one to
derive sharper results than in the unconstraint case. It will be shown in
Section IV that this case is the model which corresponds to Kennedy’s Innovation
Possibility Frontier or Ahmad’s graphic model.
A Budget constraint on total investment resources
A budget constraint on research alone
allocation of research resources of a governmental
Is useful to trace the
research institute such28
as an experiment station which indeed has a fixed research budget. But a
firm can borrow to do research or reallocate resources from the physical
investment program to research if it has a borrowing constraint but finds
research more profitable than physical investment. Likewise a country can
increase its savings rate or re-allocate resources to research from physical
investment if it faces a fixed saving rate. Establishing a budget constraint
for research and physical investment separately does not maximize returns
from total investment because rates of returns of the two kinds of investments
are not equated at the margin. Therefore, the previous model is only a
narrow special case. And it turns out that a budget constraint on total
investments alters the behavior of the model substantially,
The budget constraint is rewritten to allow the firm to use
for research purposes what it saves in capital equipment.





The sum of research and initial capital expenditures is equal to the total
budget plus the reduction in capital costs made possible by the research.
Unfortunately, this budget constraint considerably complicates
the problem. Therefore the specification of research possibilities is
simplified such that m only affects A and n only B. This is the orthogonal
case discussed before and am and 13mareequal to zero in equation 6 and in
28(a). A* and B* respectively are functions of m and n alone. The first-
order conditions of this problem, subject to (40), now become:






If research possibilities are completely neutral,a = B , the
existence of the budget constraint alone
saving direction. This can be proved as
p(m) ~ =am- l/2a2m2) then pm = a~(al/a2
biases technical change in a capital
follows: If u is quadratic, 17 (i.e.
- m) . Since al/a2 is the
level at which marginal returns to m become zero, say m* we have u = a2(m* - m).
m
Also, since m and n have the same returns function, m* = n*. Using this





Even if capital and labor costs are equal (CK = CL), m
When this does not hold, a rise in A, the shadow price
leaves m unaffected, but reduced n. In the orthogonal
(42)
will be larger than n.
of the constraint,
case a reduction in n
is always a reduction in labor-saving bias or an increase in the capital-
saving bias. Therefore, reducing the amount of total capital to the firm tends
to lead to a capital-saving bias!
The amount of capital-saving research in this formulation is
independent of the capital constraint, since it generates the capital cost
saving needed to of the research, Going through similar procedure as in the
“Kennedy” case we have:
(43)30
where gll and gzz are defined as before and
‘o
= dF - CK(l - p(m)am)dlnCK - mdlnPm - ndlnPn
Hence




Note that capital requirements after research are positive, such that
CK(1 - p(m)am) = CK(l - A*) > 0
From these equations it appears again that m is independent
labor costs and that changes in n (not
labor costs. Changes in n occur every
changes, and by the full amount of the
Otherwise the conclusions
n itself) are also independent of
of
the
time some element of the budget constraint
change in the budget constraint.
are similar to the two cases discussed
previously. A rise in CK Increases m and reduced n and therefore increase the
capital saving bias. A rise in prices of research effort reduce the activity
whose Price has risen” But in this case a rise in the price of m also
reduces n.
The purposes of the model using this budget constraint is to
show how important the specifications of the budget constraint is for the
model. Personally, T think that the model without budget constraint is by
far the most interesting one.31
Iv
LIMITATIONS, EXTENSIONS AND EQUIVALENCES
Limitations
Relaxing the assumption of fixed proportions of the production
function would probably not affect the conc],usions of the model very much as
long as the elasticity of substitution is small, but might have a substantial
impact for large elasticities of substitution. Research is under way to
assess this question.
The neglect of interdependence of research activities has been
discussed in detail before and reasons have been given why this might not be
a serious misspecification. It is hard to guess intuitively what the effect
of the introduction of such interdependencieson the model might be.
Such a prediction is much easier in the case of increasing returns
to research in the initial ranges of the research pay-bff function. The behavior
of the model would not be altered when no budget constraints exist because
research would then take place in the range of diminishing returns of the
research functions. If, however, a budget constraint was so narrow as to
constrain the research functions into the range of increasing returns,
specialization on one research line would become very likely. The choice
of which research to undertake would still be determined by factor costs,
research costs and research pay-offs.
Uncertainty has almost been assumed away by the assumption of r~sk
neutrality, Risk aversion would have a strong impact on the model, because
building the plant of existing design involves much less risk than doing32
research. A risk averse decision maker would always do less research than
a risk neutral one and he would favor that line of research which is
relatively less risky.
Productivity growth of a firm or an economy arises from many
kinds of investments.
independent, i.e., its
Research is one of them and is more or
implementation costs do most often not
less scale
depend on the
number of plants (or their scale) into which the research results are
introduced. A similar scale independencemay hold for certain management
functions. But the costs of training of labor or higher quality of other
product~on inputs or quality control, which are important sources of measured
productivity growth, do depend on scale of inputs or outputs. The model
presented here is restricted to efficiency investments whose costs are
scale independent. An important generalization of the model would be one
in which the costs of either m or n is made to depend on the scale of one of
the inputs into which the results are embodied. Such a model should allow
a theoretical investigation into the interdependence of scale-independent
and scale-dependent efficiency investments, such as research and human
capital formation.
Extension of the model into time
Evenson and Kislev (1971) have used a Markov process model to
investigate the behavior of a model of research where yield improvements are
possible in every time period without embodiment into capital investment
and where the improvements are achieved by one sampling process of a
Poisson distribution of potential yield increase.
Their work points out that a research pay-off function relating
expected yield Increases (or efficiency increases) to research effort cannot33
be independent of time or independent of achieved yield levels (efficiency
levels). Suppose the probability of potential yields is as in figure 2








Suppose AA has been achieved in period one putting the production point
to Al. To produce an increase of equal magnitude in period two will require
a much larger sample because the required expected first order statistic
is twice as large as in period one. Research uses up its own~otential —-—
pay-offs. Only if the shift in the distribution of possible yield
increases was precisely equal to achieved yield increase in each period
would it make sense to have research pay-off functions independent of
achieved yield levels (efficiency levels). But this would be a strange
coincidence.34
In addition it would also be unreasonable to assume that the
probability distribution of potential efficiency increases remain unchanged
over time sin~then profitable opportunities for research would be quickly
exhausted. Research pay-offs are likely to change because of advances in
basic sciences, results from supporting research and improvements in research
methodology. The basic problem, which any extension into time therefore
faces, is an a priori specification of how research pay-offs will change
over time and how they are affected by achieved efficiency increases. Such
a model would then trace how profitable opportunities for research arise in
the first place and how they are exhausted subsequently and trace thfs interplay
over time.
Unless an extension into time assumes that pay-off functions are
known with certainty, it will also he necessary to specify formally the link
between expected pay-offs which determine the research decisions and actual
subsequent effects of the research which takes place. In the comparative
static model discussed in this paper this problem was avojded, by
having the comparative static results trace expected biases and expected
rates of technical change, not actual ones. Of course, if expected pay-
off functions do correspond to some extent to true pay-off functions, then
the true biases and rates will correspond to some extent to the expe(ted
ones, But a dynamic model cannot get around this difficulty as easily.
The Kennedy Frontier:
The statements of induced innovation now available in the literature
are either graphic (Ahmad 1966) or use Kennedy’s (1964) Innovation Possibility
Frontier in one way or another. Ahmad’s graphic treatment is a nice approach35
to show how factor prices affect innovation. His model can be regarded as
a special case of the model presented here when there exists a fixed budget
constraint on research resources alone and when his factor prices are
reinterpreted as present value weights. Of course the idea of moving from
insoquant to insoquant costlessly would have to be dropped.
Most other induced innovation models use Kennedy’s Innovation
Possibility Frontier. The IPF fs defined as follows:
A** = h (B**) (45)
where A** and B** are instantaneous rates of decrease of A and B (see
footnot 10) and are the time continuous equivalents of our A* and B*. The
amount of labor augmentation possible is a decreasing function of the amount
of capital augmentation. Equation (45) is a production possibility curve of
factor augmentation. Note that A** is a function of B** alone.
Nordhaus (1973), in his excellent critique of this approach.
has shown that the assumption that A** be a function of B** alone, i.e., that
achieved A and B levels do not enter the Innovation Possibility Frontier is
a crucial assumption of the induced innovation theories which do use Kennedy’s
IPF. For if the achieved A and B levels are included in the IPF, a growth
model will not be stable unless technical change Is aesumad to drift in a Harrod
neutral way. Shares stability is then a result of assumption quite similar to
a growth model without ~nduced innovation at all. So such a model does not
add to our understanding of technical change. Nordhaus also shows in hi~
article that independence from achieved A and B levels implies that the
innovation process has no memory at all.
flyusing the approach of research pay-off functions it is easy to
strengthen Nordhaus’ criticism and in fact to show that an IPF like (45) is36
quite absurd as a specification of endogenous technical change. To include
dynamic considerations, rewrite the two research pay-off functions in time
continuous form and add the attained A and B levels, since it was shown in
the previous section that such an addition is necessary when the model is
extended dynamically, because research uses up its own pay-offs.
B** = gz (ITI, n, B)
n
mP‘+nP=F
Under quite general assumptions It is possible to eliminate
m and n from this system and solve for the maximum A** achievable under the
budget constrain as a declining function of B**, i.e.,
A** = H (B**, A, B, Pm, Pn, F)
This equation will reduce to (45) if
i) the levels of A and B do not enter the research pay-off functions,




research budget is constant over time,
budget constraint covers only the research budget but not
total investment budget (proof left to the reader).
In deriving an IPF in this way we first see that it can only
exist when there exists a budget constraint. But such a constraint prevents
the economy from achieving an optimal amount of research in the first place.
That amount is simply given by the budget constraint. One may of course think
that some agency first sets an optimum research budget and the model then
only traces its allocation. But the optimal amount of research would surely
not stay constant over time in a growth model (condition iii), so this
interpretation is not valid.37
(Condition Iv) implies that the budget constraint can not be
interpreted as a savings constraint either, because total savings would
cover both the research and physical investment budget. For an interpre-
tation as a savings constraint one needs two such constraints, one on
physical investment and one on research investment. But that implies that
rates of return to the two investments will differ, except by coincidence,
which again implies a misallocation of resources of the economy.
(Condition ii) that research costs stay constant over time
implies that they cannot be tied to the wage rate of an economy. In a growth
model where wages are variable one would then have to assume that the wages
of scientists stay constant. This clearly makes no sense.
Most damaging to the IPF is condition (i) because it implies
that research does not exhaust its own pay-offs as dfscussed in the previous
section. Whenever research improves the efficiency of one factor it would have
to shift the pay-off function by an amount which makes research pay-offs in
the next period equal to the research pay-offs of the last period. Such a
specification is non-sensical. This point gives added weight to Nordhaus’s (1973)
criticism discussed above.
In retrospect the IPF appears to be one of the most outstanding
cases of implicit theorizing in the economic literature. The interesting
problems posed by endogeneity of technical change, namely how to determine
optimal amounts of research and how to trade it off against investments
in physical capital is completely neglected ~~~theory.
18
It attempts to
explain constancy of shares with biased technical change with an ingeneous
device whose relationship to research processes was left in the dark long38
after the implications of the device were explored in detafl anclbecame
widely accepted wisdom. That the device cannot reasonably be generated
by a real world research process did not matter.
v
CONCLUSIONS
Some of the direct implications of the model have been
summarized in the introduction and on page 21. So only a few general
remarks are added here.
The basis of this macroeconomic approach is a reformulation
of invention possibilities on the basis of research processes and the
entrepreneurs perception of potential pay-offs of alternative research lines,
This makes it relatively easy to check whether this approach is a descr~ption
of the innovation process which has some basis in reallty. Tt shoulclalso
make it possible to use this model for empirical research because one can
conceivably ask research decisionmakerswhat their expectations are of the
pay-offs of various research lines. Descriptions of innovation possibilities
like Kennedy’s Innovation Possibility Frontier ~ Ahmad’s Innovation
Possibility Curve are so abstract that empirical measurements of them
cannot even be attempted.
Starting from actual research processes also has the advantage
that Innovation can be treated as an investment process ~n which the chofce
of the research investment portfolio depends on factor costs, research
productivities and research costs and where the outcome of the choice process
determines the direction and rate of technical change simultaneously.39
Using the new specification of innovation possibilities made jr
possible to see precisely what the assumptions are which underlie the Kennedy
approach to induced innovation and to show that this is a disguised approach
of exogenous technical change which cannot lead to optimal investment resource
allocation of an economy to physical capital and research. Furthermore,
it certainly has nothing to do with research processes as they occur in the
real world since it assumes research pay-offs as inexhaustible by the
research process. The Kennedy approach should therefore be abancloned.
The description of innovation possibilities used here implies
some simplifying assumptions which have been discussed at length. It may not
be the best or only possible description, but it is hoped that it is a start
in the right direction. In any case, the specification of innovation
possibilities is the crucial problem and will probably occupy us in further
research for quite some time to come.References
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This holds for any distribution with finite variance.
Expected pay-offfunctions which behave like equation (1) and (2) can
also be assumed for research problems which do not fit the sampling
model of research very well, such as engineering processes. Then m
can be interpreted as the amount of resources devoted to the research
process rather than as sample size. The model developed in this paper
covers both cases.
Some implications of risk aversion will be considered in section IV.
The effect of the sampling variance on the research model with a single
research process is explored in detail in Evenson and Kislev (1971).
Even organizational changes within the firm require that the employees
of the firm learn the new procedures, which involves costs. If the
employees later leave, this cost has to be incurred again. A good
example of this is the implementation of new data processing
systems in a firm.
A* and B* are treated as continuous functions of m and n. Of course,
trials in a research process are discrete. The functions have therefore
to be interpreted as continuous approximations of functions of discrete
variables.7. A pure case of factor substitutability at a cost is reached when,
after resealing K and L such that their price ratio is 1,
[E3m[ >am
Ian/ T @ —
When the equalities hold, the n and m process move the point P along







As soon as factor price change from C D to C’ D’ it may become profitable
(dependingon the price of n) to change factor proportions by the process
n. But this version of the model has only corner solutions, i.e., either
the level of m is zero or/and the level of n is zero.
8. Large research establishmentswith many research activities, would, however,
tend to increase the overall research budget if they knew from experience
that unexpected pay-offs occur frequently, but are random. The incease
would be allocated in proportion to the research activities. Inter-
action of research lines which ia known ex ante poses the same problem ——
than interaction among projects poses in conventional cost-benefit
analysis. No perfect solution to the problem has been found there.
When interactions are very strong, projects are lumped together for9.
conventional cost-benefits analysis, and the interactions are neglected
when they are weak. Each line of research used here could be considered
to be a group of strongly interacting research projects such that
interactions among n and m are minimized.
The model also neglects more basic or supportive research
which firm or experiment stations often pursue and which is not aimed
at directly yielding payoffs for a production process but rather at
increasing the productivity of more applied lines of research. It could
be viewed as aimed at altering the research productivity parameter:,
and would have to be analyzed as a separate problem. In an
agricultural experiment station context the lines considered here
would correspond to breeding and agronomic research while~cellbiology
and physiology corresponds to the supportive research. For empjrical
evidence on the productivity of such supportive research in agriculture
see Evenson (1974).
It is simetimes argued that increasing returns to research a-e frequent
because,after an initial period of investigation, a breakthrough some-
times occurs which substantially increases pay-off to that particular
line of research. The true response curve exhibited increasing returns.
But again, the ex ante subjective research function exhibited
diminishing returns, since the breakthrough was not expected, or had
a small probability associated with it. For had it been otherwise,
the decision maker would have made a large research investment in this line
right from the start. His small investment lead to the formulation ofa new expected research function with higher pay-offs. But this new
research function will exhibit diminishing returns as well.
Of course, if a line of research requires an initial fixed investment
before any trials can occur, the response curve will have an initial
range of increasing returns. A research establishment without budget
constraint will, however, not operate in this range, just as a
competitive firm will not produce in such a range of an ordinary
production function. In section IV this problem will be reexamined
in the context of a budget constraint.
10 l Tn the time continuous case this would become Q = (A** - B**) where
A** = -din.A/dt and B** = -din B/dt.
11. This bias and rate of technical change are expected bias and rate, not
actual one and the comparative static analysis traces influences on
expected magnitudes.
12. Assumptions (7) and (8a) assure that the benefits from research (second
and third termin (15)) are monotonically increasing functions of m ancl
n, and that the second-order conditions for maximization hold. When





research line the absolute size of the factor saving effect must
exceed the absolute size of the factor using effect by a faction which
depends on the relative share ratio. (16) is assumed to hold for the
remainder of the paper when the substitution case (8b) is discussed.13. This latter neglect is especially important when induced innovation
is to be introduced into a many sector model as in Kennecly(1973),
because research resources should also be allocated to sectors accordjng
to marginal benefits of research in each sector. Exogenously
specifying Kennedy frontiers for each sector may optimize wjthjn--
sector research resource allocation but not allocation among
sectors.
14. At the micro level at which this model is developed initial efficiency
is of course given. The relevant forces altering costR are factor
prices and scale of output.
15. It is easy to introduce capital maintenance costs into the model by
simply discounting them and adding them to CK. Similarly for any other
costs associated with labor in addition to wages.
Also, if research takes time and delays the building of the plant by
a number of years, lost output or the cost of continuing to operate
with the old plant can be subtracted from Vo, The present value of the
model with research has then to exceed the present value wjthout
research if research is to be undertaken at all.
16. Note that, if capital maintenance and operating costs were included
in CK, r and T would influence research both through C and C . A
K L
method similar to the one used for Y then be needed to establish signs.
17. This assumption is not necessary, but the proof is not as simple
otherwise.18. Conslik (1969) has an interesting alternative to the IPF with which one
could possibly address these questions. But in the model which he builds
with it he again takes the decisions of how much resources allocated
to research and how to allocate the research resources to increase
augmented capital versus augmented labor as exogenous or depending
on a mechanism for which he refuses to give an economic rationali-
zation. Therefore, while his approach is interesting, it again
represents a case of implicit theorizing.Abstract
A macroeconomic approach to induced innovation, by Hans
P. Binswanger.
Invention possibilities are reformulated using research
processes which have a cost and different implications for
rates and biases of technical change. In the comparative
static model a firm has the choice to build a plant of
existing design or to improve it by research. The firm
maximizes present value over the lifetime of the plant.
Research costs and present value of capital and labor costs
influence research mix and rate and bias to technical
change. Controversies in the literature of induced
innovation are discussed in terms of the model. A ri~e
in labor costs does not necessarily lead to a more labor
saving bias.Mathematical Supplement
to
“A Macroeconomic Approach to Induced Innovation”
For Review Purpouses only
The techniques used are all standard
of the derivations are given in the
totally and rearranged as follows:
calculus. Up to equation (31) the details
paper. (31) is first differentiated
(a) - Pmdm - Pndn = - dF + mdp’”+ ndPn
(b) - Pmdl +pm(CKam+CLBm)dm= -umamdCK - pmf3mdCL+ (1 + ~)dPm
(c) - PndA +pm(CKan +CIBn)dn = - pnandCK - pnBndCI,+ (1 + a)dpn
Now change the signs of all equations and set Pm = Pn = 1 so that dPm = cllnl’n)
and dPn = dlnPn. Then divide (b) and (c) by (1 + a) and note that (CKam +
CL13m)/(1 + a) = l/Pm and similarly for the bracketed expres~ion in (c). Th~s
can be seen from 31. Also multiply all terms in dC~ by CK/CK and the terms in
dCL by CL/CL. This leaves us with
dm + dn = dF - mdlnPm - ndlnPn
~m da -~dm
CKumam cLlJm6m
l+A Pm “—dlnCK +. l+A dlnC - dlnPm
1+?! 1,
Pn d~ ~ dn
cKllnan
dlnCK C~lJn6n dlnc _ dlnpn
I+a pn l+A l+A ‘L
This is the same thing than the matrix equation after (31) with the notation
changed as in the definitions which follow that matrix equation. The matrjx
Is then inverted to derive equation (32).
The procedure to go from (41) to (43) is the same one than to go from (31)
to (32)